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McGrath: Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, And the Rights of Faith-Based Ado

FULTON V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, AND THE RIGHTS OF FAITH-BASED ADOPTION AND FOSTER
CARE AGENCIES
I. BACKGROUND
In Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) contracts with 30 private foster care agencies. 1 Each of these private foster care agencies
is expected to provide foster care services through a contract with DHS.
In November 2015, DHS and Catholic Social Services (“CSS”) entered into such a
contract. 2 Under the contract, CSS was to ensure that foster parents were “screened, trained, and
certified by the Provider [CSS].” 3 A section of the contract limited the reasons that CSS may refuse
to provide the services required under the contract, notably “unless an exception is granted by the
Commissioner or the Commissioner's designee, in his/her sole discretion.” 4 Article XV of the
contract further limited the reasons that CSS could refuse to provide the services required under
the contract by incorporating the various laws, notably the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance
which provides that the agency would not discriminate on the basis of inter alia, “sex” or “sexual
orientation.” 5 In the event of CSS's breach, DHS and Philadelphia would be permitted to suspend
or terminate the contract. 6
On March 8, 2018, DHS Commissioner Figueroa (“Figueroa”) learned that two of its
contracting foster agencies, CSS and Bethany Christian Services (“Bethany”), had policies that
denied their publicly-funded services to married same-sex couples. 7 Figueroa formed this belief
after discussions with a local news reporter on an upcoming story regarding CSS’s policies. 8
Next, Figueroa contacted Bethany, CSS, various DHS's faith-based foster care agencies,
and a nonfaith-based agency to determine what those agencies' policies were regarding serving
same-sex couples. James Amato of CSS explained to Figueroa that there were two services that
CSS would not provide to same-sex couples: (1) CSS would not certify same-sex couples as
prospective foster parents even if the couples were otherwise eligible foster parents under state
regulations, and (2) CSS would not provide a same-sex couple with a home study as part of a same-

1

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub
nom. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020)
(“Fulton II”).
2
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d 661, 670 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff'd, 922 F.3d
140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 140 S.
Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020) (“Fulton I”).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 671.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 671–72.
8
Fulton I, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 672.
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sex couple's application for adoption. 9 Amato recalled that DHS told him “you are
discriminating,” to which he responded “I am following the teachings of the Catholic Church.” 10
On March 15, 2018, Figueroa closed intake of foster children to CSS. That same day
Philadelphia City Council separately passed its own resolution authorizing the Committee on
Public Health and Human Services to “investigate [DHS] policies on contracting with social
services agencies that either discriminate against prospective LGBTQ foster parents and allow
non-LGBTQ foster parents to discriminate against children.”
CSS was the recipient of considerable animosity from government officials at each stage
of this process. Philadelphia City Council passed a resolution labeling CSS's actions
"discrimination that occurs under the guise of religious freedom." 11 The Commissioner told CSS
that "times have changed," "attitudes have changed," that it was "not 100 years ago," and that its
policy on foster families conflicted with the teachings of the Pope. 12
It is worth nothing that in the wake of CSS closing its doors to Philadelphia foster
placements, the ministry now has dozens of available foster homes sitting empty—even though
more children in Philadelphia need foster care now than at any time in the past decade. In 2019,
the city confessed that there were 250 children that needed to be moved out from the city’s
overcrowded congregate care facilities into foster homes, but that it did not have enough available
foster homes to meet the demand. 13
It is also significant that Chief Justice Roberts explicitly predicted that this very type of
case would come before the Court in his dissent in the seminal 2015 case of Obergefell v. Hodges 14
This illustrates that at least one member of the Court possesses foresight as to how future cases
utilizing Smith’s rigid framework will continue to pervade almost any government practice that
works alongside a faith-based organization.

9

Id. (See Jun. 21, 2018 Hr'g Tr. 3:18–24 (Figueroa); see also Jun. 19, 2018 Hr'g Tr.
55:7–20 (Amato) (testifying that Commissioner Figueroa and another DHS officer asked Amato
whether CSS would complete a home study for “a same-sex couple or individual” and that
Amato confirmed that CSS would not complete such a home study for a couple and would only
provide a home study for an individual if that individual was committed to living single.).
10
Id., citing Jun. 19, 2018 Hr'g Tr. 55:22–25 (Amato).
11
Respondent’s Brief, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 1104, 206
L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020) (“Fulton III”).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
576 U.S. 644, 711, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2015) (Noting “[h]ard
questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with
the new right to same-sex marriage—when, for example . . . a religious adoption agency declines
to place children with same-sex married couples.”)
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
CSS filed suit on May 17, 2018 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. 15 The district court denied CSS preliminary relief. The court ultimately held that
Philadelphia had “a neutral law of general applicability under Smith.” 16
CSS appealed and sought emergency relief from the Third Circuit, which was denied, and
then from the Supreme Court of the United States. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling on April 22, 2019. 17 The key question, according to the panel, was whether Philadelphia
“treat[ed] CSS worse than it would have treated another organization that did not work with samesex couples as foster parents but had different religious beliefs[.]” 18
The court rejected CSS’s targeting arguments: the Commissioner’s comment that CSS
needed to follow the teachings of Pope Francis was merely “an effort to reach common ground.” 19
The Mayor’s comments were not considered “significant.” 20 The City Council’s resolution
labeling CSS’s actions “discrimination that occurs under the guise of” religion were held to fall
within a “grey zone.” 21
The Third Circuit thus concluded that Philadelphia was enforcing a neutral and generally
applicable policy per Smith. 22 To hold otherwise, it warned, would make Smith “a dead letter,” as
well as “the nation’s civil rights laws.” 23 The court also rejected CSS’s free speech claim, holding
that because Philadelphia funded aspects of CSS’s foster care program, “the [City’s] condition
pertain[ed] to the program receiving government money.” 24
III. PARTY ARGUMENTS
Petitioners (CSS) sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court of the United States
granted. 25 In its brief to the Court, Petitioner argued that under Employment Division v. Smith the
city loses because its law is neither “neutral” nor “generally applicable.”
Petitioner argued that Philadelphia had no neutral law because it “decided on an outcome
and then tried to find a law to fit. When it couldn’t, it reverse-engineered policies to justify its
actions. This is the inverse of the neutral law in Smith.” 26
Petitioner also claimed that Philadelphia did not have a generally applicable law due to its
individualized exemptions, and because Philadelphia “granted the Commissioner carte blanche to
give exemptions.” 27 Petitioner pointed out the irony that no such exemption was granted for CSS’s
15

Fulton I, 320 F. Supp. 3d 661.
Fulton II, 922 F.3d at 153 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
17
Id. at 165.
18
Id. at 156.
19
Id. at 158.
20
Id. at 157.
21
Id.
22
Fulton II, 922 F.3d at 157.
23
Id. at 159.
24
Id. at 161.
25
Fulton III., 140 S. Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020).
26
Id. at 157.
27
Petitioner’s Brief, Fulton III, 140 S. Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020).
16
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religious exercise in spite of the other exemptions given. 28 Petitioner stated further that the City
violates its own rules, and allows other agencies to do so, too by the myriad of exceptions it gives
to its own law. 29
Petitioner also claimed that the City is in violation of the First Amendment due to its
attempt to compel a private organization’s speech. 30 Petitioner articulated that the City plainly
conditions participation in the foster care system on making certain written certifications about
marriage. 31
In the alternative, petitioner argued that Smith should be overruled. 32 Petitioner essentially
argued that the case provides a perfect example of why Smith should be overruled—despite all the
alleged constitutional violations of the City, the Third Circuit still ruled against petitioners based
on Smith. 33 Petitioner opined that Smith is unsupported by the text, history, and tradition of the
Free Exercise Clause, and offered that “the best approach is to revisit Smith and apply strict
scrutiny to government actions infringing on religious exercise.” 34
As an alternative to its alternative argument, petitioner argued that if the Court does not
overrule Smith, it should clarify that history must guide the application of the Free Exercise Clause
as it does for the Establishment Clause. 35
Respondent made multiple argument in its merit brief to the Court for the free exercise
claim: First, Respondent argued that CSS lacks a constitutional right to demand that DHS offer it
a contract that omits the same non- discrimination requirement every other FFCA must follow
when performing services for the City. 36
Respondent reasoned that “[m]echanically transplanting the Court’s ordinary free-exercise
framework to the managerial context would severely intrude on the flexibility the government
requires to manage its workforce.” Respondent argued that the Court should give the government
greater deference to manage agencies it controls than in other free exercise situations.
Respondent next argued that the non-discrimination requirement falls within the scope of
the government’s managerial authority. Specifically, it restricts how CSS carries out a contractual
responsibility and delegated government power in certifying foster parents but does not affect how
CSS speaks or acts in its capacity “as a citizen.” 37
Respondent also argued that under Smith, the non-discrimination requirement is also
generally applicable and neutral. 38 Respondent argues that the requirement is generally applicable
because every FFCA contract contains an identical requirement, which applies the same way to

28

Id.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Petitioner’s Brief, Fulton III 140 S. Ct. at 1104.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Respondent’s Brief, Fulton III, 140 S. Ct. 1104, citing Engquist v. Ore. Dep’t of Agric.,
553 U.S. 591, 599 (2008).
37
Id., citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422–423 (2006).
38
Id.
29
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religious and non-religious beliefs. 39 Respondent purported to prove neutrality by claiming that
the City’s “text and operation” show no religious hostility, and that the record supports this. 40
Respondent argued that CSS’s free speech claim is also without merit. 41 The argument is
similar in substance to its free exercise arguments—that the non-discrimination requirement
regulates how CSS performs its contractual duties for the government; it does not obligate CSS to
make statements about the validity of same-sex relationships; and it is directed at conduct, not
speech. 42
Finally, respondent argued that The Court should not reconsider Smith. 43 Respondent
opined that this case would be “an extremely poor vehicle” to do so, given that it arises in the
government contracting context, and because the non-discrimination requirement satisfies strict
scrutiny in any event. 44 Further, respondent argued that the petitioners have not made the showing
necessary to justify overturning “Justice Scalia’s landmark decision in Smith.” 45
IV. PREDICTION
During oral argument, the Justices seemingly showed no serious interest in overruling
Smith based on (1) their lack of questions on the subject, and (2) petitioner (CSS) leading with the
argument that even under Smith, CSS would prevail. In fact, Justice Barrett bluntly asked
petitioner’s counsel “if you’re right about that [prevailing even under Smith] why should we even
entertain the question whether to overrule Smith?” 46
If the Court decides not overrule Smith, there are two likely paths of analysis that the Court
could take: The first path would result in the Court rendering a narrow, fact-heavy decision based
on the evident hostility shown by Philadelphia toward CSS's religious beliefs. 47
The Court could conclude that this "hostility on the part of the State" fell below the
minimum requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. 48 Stanford Law Professor Michael McConnell
refers to this potential path as "Masterpiece 2.0," because of is striking similarity to the Court's
reasoning in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. 49 There, the Court’s
reasoning rested on "religious hostility on the part of the State itself," and specifically on "the

39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Respondent’s Brief, Fulton III, 140 S. Ct. 1104.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29:23, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 140 S.
Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020).
47
Michael McConnell, Prof. Michael McConnell (Stanford) on Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, REASON (Nov. 6, 2020), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/06/prof-michaelmcconnell-stanford-on-fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia/.
48
Id.
49
Id., citing Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018).
40
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Commission's consideration of Phillips' case," which the Court held "was neither tolerant nor
respectful of Phillips' religious beliefs." 50
However, this line of reasoning drew little commentary at oral argument. This could be in
part due to the lack of aid that Masterpiece provided in helping “reduce the temperature” on gay
rights and religious freedom by its implicit suggestion that punitive actions towards those with a
minority view on marriage are acceptable so long as the government less explicitly exhibits its
hostility. 51 It is also likely that the Court would rather not make the subjective motivations of
government actors central to constitutional law. 52
The other path would be to use Fulton as a vehicle to correct the Third Circuit’s narrow
holding in this case. As shown by Lukumi, decided only three (3) years after Smith, Smith does not
have to be a wrecking ball for religious freedom. 53
In order to correct the Third Circuit’s narrow interpretation, the Court could clarify the
meaning of the terms “neutral” and “general applicability.” The City desires for the Court to focus
on only the evaluations of foster families by foster agencies and analyze if the City permits other
agencies to engage in the same conduct as CSS but for non-religious reasons.
However, whether the City has actually allowed a secular organization to exclude samesex couples is not the relevant question under Smith. Rather, the question here should be whether,
by the terms of its policy, the City possesses the right to make exceptions.
It is undisputed that the City carves out other exceptions from its nondiscrimination policy,
for other foster-care organizations; In Smith, in its discussion of Sherbert, the Court made clear
that regulatory schemes that allow case-by-case discretion are not "generally applicable." 54
Next, the Court can clarify Smith's “neutrality” standard. 55 Here, CSS had provided foster
care services in Philadelphia for 200 years—long before the City became involved and the City
had no policy that would exclude CSS.
The City’s motives here were certainly not neutral, by whatever ambiguous standard Smith
sets forth. Philadelphia politicians, in response to the Philadelphia Inquirer article on CSS,
instructed the city’s lawyers to find a way to exclude foster care agencies that “discriminate under
the guise of religious freedom." 56 In response, the city crafted a policy that effectively excluded
CSS without interfering with the ability of other foster care agencies to operate out of compliance
with other aspects of the anti-discrimination policy.
The logic of Smith is that policies that apply to all parties are not unconstitutional when
they happen to conflict with one party's religious exercise. 57 That does not license governments to
proactively craft policies to exclude religious entities and exempt others. 58

50

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719.
McConnell, supra note 47.
52
Id.
53
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
54
McConnell, supra note 47.
55
Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
56
McConnell, supra note 47.
57
Id.
58
Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
51
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Finally, the Court could theoretically find the City’s policy Constitutional if it “burdens the
free exercise of religion,” but “serves a compelling governmental purpose in the least restrictive
way.” It is not likely that the City's policy would satisfy this extremely high standard. 59
The justification for the City's policy seems to be to prevent the insult to same-sex couples
that is implied by their exclusion from CSS's program. 60 However, purely implied impacts are a
dangerous ground for compelling governmental interests; people have a fundamental right of free
speech to express disapproval of state-approved conduct. 61
This line of logic was indirectly hinted at during oral argument, principally by Justice
Breyer. 62 Justice Breyer asked Petitioner a line of questions related to whether the City could add
a blanket disclaimer to its provider application. 63 This hypothetical disclaimer would state that a
given religious provider was not acting in opposition to its religious beliefs but rather just
following the City’s policy.
On one hand, this line of logic proves that the City’s policy is not the least restrictive way.
Clearly, the City could craft such language into its contract so as to not immediately shut down
hundreds of foster homes and leave hundreds more foster children lingering in the system.
On the other hand, this reasoning promotes coercion of religious groups to “claim” their
religious beliefs by quite literally disclaiming them in the same breath. This coercion, even without
the disclaimer, was on full display in this case through Bethany’s compliance with the City’s
mandate. 64 The Court has held that coercion by government conduct is a fundamental hallmark of
an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Thus, Breyer’s hypothetical disclaimer solution
would lead to religious organization’s beliefs existing in theory and principle only, with an
inability to manifest such in its actions.
More important in this analysis are the material effects. 65 The City’s argument potentially
wins if CSS were the only foster-care organization or if there were any evidence that same-sex
couples were hindered by CSS's policy (as Justice Kavanaugh asked about at oral argument). 66 But
this is contrary to the facts of the case where there were 30 providers and no actual evidence of
hindrance.

59

McConnell, supra note 47, quoting Lukumi 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id.
61
Id.
62
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45:11-46:7, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020).
63
Transcript of Oral Argument at 103:6-11, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020) (Respondent’s Counsel Jeffrey Fisher paraphrasing
Breyer’s statement as suggesting that CSS “can disclaim that and make very clear that all they're
doing is following state law and to carry out a government function on the government's
behalf and they're not purporting to speak for themselves in any certifications.”).
64
Fulton I, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 690–91 (explaining that after Philadelphia threatened to close
Bethany Christian, the organization relented and agreed to alter its longstanding religious
practice).
65
Id.
66
Id., citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 52:7, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020).
60
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The true effect of the City's policy is to reduce the availability of foster placements for all
children. 67 As Department of Justice attorney Hashim Mooppan argued in support of CSS: "what
the City has done is worse than cutting off its nose to spite its face. What it is doing is cutting off
homes from the most vulnerable children in the City to spite the Catholic Church." 68
The City’s final argument ducks the Constitutional implications of the case. The argument
is that the City did not exclude CSS from the foster care program under its regulatory power but
merely refused to enter into a contract with it.
The City has said throughout this dispute that it is enforcing the Fair Practices Ordinance,
which applies across the board to private and business conduct and has nothing to do with
contracting. 69 If upheld, the City's rule could be applied to religious schools, hospitals, and
homeless shelters rather than solely entities required to contract with the City, as implied by Justice
Barrett’s comments at oral argument. 70 As CSS counsel Lori Windham pointed out, this would
mean "the Free Exercise Clause [would] shrink every time the government expands its reach." 71
In my opinion, the second path is the most persuasive. The City’s open hostility towards
CSS has its fingerprints on every aspect of the situation-- Philadelphia City Council enacted a
resolution rquired DHS to amend the method by which it contracts with prospective foster homes
and condemned “discrimination that occurs under the guise of religious freedom.” 72 Philadelphia’s
mayor publicly insulted the Archdiocese, calling the Archbishop of Philadelphia’s Chaput’s
conduct “not Christian,” and requesting that Pope Francis “kick some ass here!” 73. The DHS
Commissioner urged CSS to follow “the teachings of Pope Francis,” and told it that “‘times have
changed,’ ‘attitudes have changed,’ and CSS should change its policy because it is ‘not 100 years
ago.’” 74
While the lower courts concluded that such did not amount to hostility towards religion in
large part because of fellow Philadelphia Christian agency Bethany’s decision to comply with the
City’s request, this is hardly a convincing argument. The notion that another Christian succumbing
to the state’s pressure to mute its sincerely held religious beliefs is evidence that the policy was
not hostile is perplexing. I would argue that this is diametrically opposed to such a conclusion
under such circumstances and clearly amounts to government coercion, which the Court has held
is an unconstitutional establishment of religion.” 75

67

Id.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 56:18-22, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020).
69
McConnell, supra note 47.
70
Id., citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 98:14-19, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020).
71
Id., citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 23:20-23, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 1104, 206 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2020).
72
Brief for Petitioners at 9, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19-123 (emphasis added).
73
Id. at 10.
74
Id. at 11, 16.
75
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. at 2072 (Thomas, J concurring in judgment).
68
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V. ARKANSAS IMPLICATIONS
At the time of this writing, approximately 40 percent 76 of foster parents in Arkansas are
sourced through The CALL, a faith-based organization that “recruits families out of local
churches, trains them[,] and then provides support.” 77
In contrast with CSS’s relationship with Philadelphia DHS, The CALL “does not receive
a single government dollar for supplying nearly half of Arkansas’ foster homes.” 78 Thus, The
CALL’s relationship with Arkansas Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) is less
direct than CSS’s with Philadelphia DHS.
The CALL’s role is to recruit Christian families to become foster parents, and to provide a
state-approved foster care certification training program. The latter came in response to findings
from a 2015 review of DCFS commissioned by the governor and conducted by consultant Paul
Vincent of the Child Welfare Policy and Practice Group. 79 The study found that DCFS was having
trouble moving new foster parents through the certification process. 80
In response, The CALL began its own, foster parent certification training after obtaining
explicit permission from DCFS to create an adapted version of PRIDE. 81 Arkansas requires foster
families to undergo a specific 30-hour training model called “Foster/Adopt PRIDE,” which DCFS
provides through a non-profit contractor. PRIDE classes through DCFS take place over a twomonth period in only five locations throughout the state, so families in remote areas have to drive
long distances to attend. 82 In contrast, The CALL’s training is delivered locally and compresses
the PRIDE curriculum into two weekends 83.
DCFS spokesperson Amy Webb stated that DCFS “does not necessarily avoid placing
youth who identify as LGBT with CALL-recruited families. It does take into account the
preferences of the child and the foster parents, she said, so as to ensure stable placements.” 84
When asked if The CALL “avoids proselytizing to LGBT foster children,” Executive
Director of The CALL, Laura Currier, stated that “DCFS provides policies and guidelines
regarding respecting the beliefs of children and youth in foster care. The families recruited by The
CALL follow these policies and guidelines. These families simply live out their Christian faith on
a daily basis as an example of a way of living.” 85

76

Benjamin Hardy, In Arkansas, One Faith-Based Group Recruits Almost Half of Foster
Homes, IMPRINT NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017), https://imprintnews.org/featured/arkansas-one-faithbased-group-recruits-almost-half-foster-homes/28821.
77
Michael Howell-Moroney, Faith-Based Partnerships and Foster Parent Satisfaction, 36 J.
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. ADMIN. 228, 233 (2013).
78
Hardy, supra note 76.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Hardy, supra note 76.
85
Id.
81
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Arkansas is among thirty-two states that has rejected Smith by statute, with legislation
passed in the 2019 Legislative Session comprising what is essentially a state equivalent of the
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 86
Thus, Arkansas possesses both a (1) well-maintained but hands-off relationship between
DCFS and its relevant Christian foster care agency The CALL, as well as (2) recent statutory
guidance explicitly rejecting Smith in favor of the Sherbert v. Yoder and Wisconsion v. Yoder
decisions. 87
CSS’s relationship with Philadelphia DHS as well as its regulations stands in stark contrast
to the Arkansas landscape. CSS acted as a contractor of the state in certification of foster families
and signed off on contractual policy that prohibited it from utilizing its discretion to act in
accordance with its Christian beliefs when matching families. Additionally, comments by the
mayor of Philadelphia that "times have changed," "attitudes have changed," and that it was "not
100 years ago," and that its policy on foster families conflicts with the teaching of the Pope, as
well as comments by DHS Director Figueroa reflect a sour relationship between DHS and CSS.
In contrast to Arkansas’ recent statutory implementation, intended to “provide a claim or
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.” 88
Philadelphia’s regulations prohibited CSS from acting in accordance with its sincerely held
religious beliefs in serving as a foster care agency as it had done for over 200 years.
Regardless of whether the Court decides to overrule Smith, The CALL is afforded
protections in preferential state legislation and a well-maintained, hands-off relationship with
DCFS that CSS frankly was not. Thus, the hundreds foster children in waiting in Arkansas will
not have to lose sleep at the prospect of 40% of the state’s foster homes being shut down overnight.
Neither will the foster parents recruited through The CALL, 36% of whom stated would not have
become foster parents if not for The CALL. 89
Minimizing the number of children-in-waiting in foster care is one goal that all can agree
is “neutral and generally applicable.” Whether the Court’s rule of law in this case comes from
Smith, a new test altogether, or otherwise, the Court’s holding should seek to (1) minimize the
delay in placing foster children with a family to call home, and (2) maximize the number of
otherwise qualified foster placements available.
William G. McGrath*

86

Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 844
n.22 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-402(1) (declaring the intent of the act “[t]o restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases in which free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened.).
87
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-402(1); see also Hardy, supra note 76.
88
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-402(3).
89
See Hardy, supra note 76.
* J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law, expected
May 2021. B.B.A., Baylor University.
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